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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n > m agents
with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow
payments and focus on dominant–strategy implementation. In the absence
of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the
payments must be burnt to support dominant–strategy implementation.
Recent work modified the classic VCG mechanism by redistributing as
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much of the payments as possible back to the agents while still satisfying
incentive constraints. This approach guarantees allocative efficiency, but in
some cases a large percentage of social welfare is lost. In this paper, we
provide a mechanism that is not allocatively efficient but is instead guar-
anteed to achieve at least 80% of the social welfare as n → ∞. Moreover,
in the extreme case of m = n − 1 where VCG–based mechanisms provide
zero welfare, the percentage of social welfare maintained by our mechanism
asymptotically approaches 100%.
1. Introduction
Suppose six city–dwelling roommates jointly own a car that seats five people.
They decide to take a trip to the countryside. While they all would like to
go, there is not room for all of them in the car. Some need the fresh country
air while others would not really mind staying home. The roommates do not
necessarily know one another’s desires, but each of them knows her own true
value of getting out of the city. How should they decide who gets to go?
Against this background, we study a class of resource allocation prob-
lems, in which m identical items need to be distributed among n > m agents.
Each agent wants exactly one item, and has a private value for that item.
We assume the agents can make monetary payments, and have quasi–linear
utilities. Under these assumptions, agents can be incentivized to reveal their
private values truthfully. Unlike traditional auction settings, we focus on
scenarios with no auctioneer. Such scenarios include the allocation of uni-
versity parking spots among faculty members, free tickets for a sporting event
among club members, or seats on an overbooked airplane. In the presence of
a participant possessing no private information (e.g., an auctioneer), mone-
tary payments can be absorbed by him, thus achieving budget balance. In
our setting however, all agents have private information, and any collected
payments need to be burnt in order to maintain truthful reporting. Burning
money is undesirable as it decreases social welfare. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to design mechanisms that ensure a high level of social welfare while
maintaining the incentives.
In this work, we focus on strategy–proof mechanisms, which require that
it be a dominant strategy for each agent to report her value truthfully. This
requirement is less permissive, but more robust than Bayesian implementa-
tion. In particular, agents are more likely to play a dominant strategy than a
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strategy that is optimal only when other agents play their part of the truthful
equilibrium. Perhaps even more importantly, dominant–strategy implemen-
tation does not require any assumptions about the distribution of the agents’
values (or their beliefs about those values), nor their attitude towards risk.
As for measuring the appeal of various strategy–proof mechanisms, we
choose the strictest and most robust metric: worst–case performance. More
specifically, if one fixes the agents’ profile of values, one can compute the
ratio of the social welfare realized by the mechanism over the maximal social
welfare that could be achieved, should these values be known. Since these
values are not known, nor is their probabilistic distribution, the appeal of a
strategy–proof mechanism is measured by the minimum of this ratio over all
possible value profiles. We call this ratio a social welfare ratio,3 and we use
it to determine a mechanism’s worst–case (i.e., guaranteed) level of social
welfare: reaching a level α ∈ [0, 1] means that a mechanism realizes at least
a proportion α of the maximal social welfare for every possible profile of the
agents’ values.
In addition to strategy–proofness, we also impose the following natu-
ral constraints: 1) feasibility—no more than m items can be allocated, and
monetary deficits are not allowed (i.e., no external subsidy), 2) individual
rationality—each agent’s total utility is nonnegative, and 3) anonymity—the
allocation and payment decision applied to each agent does not depend on
her identity. The question we are interested in can now be stated formally:
Find a mechanism that maximizes the worst–case social welfare
ratio among all those that are strategy–proof, feasible, individually
rational, and anonymous.
Recently, two sets of authors (Moulin (2009) and Guo and Conitzer
(2009)) solved the above question under the additional constraint that the
items be allocated to the m agents who value them most. Their solution char-
acterized the best mechanism within the class of Groves mechanisms,4 which
has received special attention in the economics literature because members of
this class admit a simple functional form (cf. characterization by Green and
Laffont (1979)). A Groves mechanism guarantees an efficient allocation of all
3The same measure is used in (Moulin, 2009; Guo and Conitzer, 2009).
4The most well-known Groves mechanism is the VCG mechanism. Here, the terms
Groves mechanisms and VCG redistribution mechanisms are used interchangeably.
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m items, but not necessarily a good level of “overall” efficiency (as measured
for instance by the worst–case social welfare ratio), because allocative effi-
ciency may come at the cost of “burning” quite a bit of money to meet the
incentive constraints, whereas it may be better in terms of overall efficiency
to destroy some items in order to burn less money. Indeed, one can easily
check that it is impossible to guarantee a strictly positive worst–case social
welfare ratio using a Groves mechanism when m = n − 1, while applying
the best Groves mechanism after destroying one item would secure a strictly
positive ratio.
Still, applying a Groves mechanism after destroying some fixed number
of items is not the best way to optimize overall efficiency. Rather, we show
that contingent destruction mechanisms, which make destruction decisions
based on the values agents report, perform better. In fact, all strategy–proof
mechanisms rely on contingent payments , as well as contingent destruction:
an agent receives an item if and only if her reported value is larger than a
threshold value, which in general depends on other agents’ reports. We refer
to such mechanisms as threshold mechanisms.
The question of finding the best threshold mechanism is more complicated
than the question of finding the best Groves mechanism. The Groves mech-
anism’s allocation function is constant once the agents’ values are ordered
(the agents with the m highest values receive the items). In this restricted
context, Guo and Conitzer (2009) and Moulin (2009) calculate the optimal
payment function. In contrast, allocation functions in the broader class of
threshold mechanisms are not constant.
Our approach is designed to achieve the right balance between tractabil-
ity, and showing that one can obtain a significant improvement in overall
welfare if one does not rely on the technical convenience of Groves mech-
anisms. Even a very minor departure from VCG—destroying at most one
item—allows for drastic savings in problem instances with many agents and
items. Importantly, the ratio guarantee improves as the number of items
increases. Perhaps most striking is the case where m = n − 1. As already
pointed out, Groves mechanisms do not provide any strictly positive ratio
in this case. Further, applying the best Groves mechanism after destroying
a fixed number of items does not guarantee a ratio larger than 1/2 (see nu-
merical computations in Guo and Conitzer (2008)). In contrast, our method
of contingent destruction guarantees the ratio of 1 − 2
n2−n , which rapidly
approaches 1 as n increases. Finally, an additional advantage of our mecha-
nism is that it has a much simpler analytical form than the optimal Groves
4
mechanism.
In more detail, our threshold mechanism, termed SimpleDestroy, charges
each allocated agent her threshold. If the total payment is low, all items are
allocated efficiently. If the total payment is high, then one item is destroyed,
the remaining items are allocated efficiently, and most of the payments are
redistributed back to the agents. SimpleDestroy complements the optimal
efficient mechanism (Moulin, 2009; Guo and Conitzer, 2009): the former per-
forms best when the number of items is high, while the ratio of the latter
decreases with the number of items. At the respective extremes each mecha-
nism performs poorly: the ratio of SimpleDestroy is zero for m = 1, and the
ratio of the optimal efficient mechanism is zero for m = n−1. However, using
the better of the two mechanisms can provide good performance guarantees
for all m and n. In fact, we provide a hybrid mechanism that guarantees the
ratio of .8 as n increases and m = αn for any α ∈ (0, 1).
We discuss related literature next. Optimal efficient mechanisms have
recently been studied in a series of papers. Mechanisms that are applicable
in any setting where VCG can be used have been proposed by Bailey (1997)
and Cavallo (2006). Only the latter mechanism is guaranteed to be budget-
balanced in all settings. As already mentioned, Guo and Conitzer (2009)
and Moulin (2009) independently discover the optimal VCG redistribution
mechanism for the allocation domain studied here. Guo and Conitzer (2010b)
derive a linear redistribution Groves mechanism to maximize the expected
social welfare when the distribution of agents’ values is known. Porter et al.
(2004) study the problem of allocating undesirable goods (e.g., tasks) to
agents in a fair manner. In the model where a single item (task) needs
to be allocated, the mechanisms by Porter, Bailey, and Cavallo coincide.5
Naroditskiy et al. (2012) provide a characterization of optimal redistribution
functions in single-parameter domains, and extend the mechanism by Porter
et al. (2004) to multiple tasks. Optimal redistribution when heterogeneous
items are allocated have been conjectured by Gujar and Narahari (2011) and
proved by Guo (2012).
Welfare maximization has also been considered in randomized mecha-
nisms. Faltings (2005), for instance, proposes a generally-applicable mecha-
nism that picks an agent at random, excludes him from allocation, and makes
5A detailed discussion of relationship between these mechanisms appears in (Guo and
Conitzer, 2009).
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him the recipient of the VCG payments. The mechanism (also studied in Guo
and Conitzer (2008); Guo et al. (2011)) achieves budget balance, but loses
efficiency for value profiles where the excluded agent’s value is high enough
to be allocated. The guaranteed ratio is n−1
n
, however this is a somewhat
weaker metric as the ratio now is expected over the random choice of the
excluded agent.
Most related to our work is the work on randomized mechanisms by Guo
and Conitzer (2008). Starting from the observation that destroying items
might save enough money to be socially beneficial, they limit attention to
allocation rules where the number of items destroyed is independent of the
agents’ reports. In order for the social benefit to be more significant, they
allow for that number to be determined randomly. Instead, we observe that
significant gains can be achieved via deterministic mechanisms provided one
uses contingent destruction rules. Furthermore, Guo and Conitzer require
feasibility only in expectation, and need to assume that the agents are risk
neutral. Our deterministic analysis dispenses with these assumptions. If one
is willing to use lotteries, then it may be of interest to combine the insights
from our two papers, making Guo and Conitzer’s random variables depend
on reported values.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in ACM EC 09 (de Clip-
pel et al., 2009). The results in Section 4, which are the main analytical
contribution of this paper, are novel.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 formally states the problem we
are studying. A computational method of searching for an optimal mecha-
nism in a restricted setting is proposed and applied in Section 3. Based on
the numerical results, we discern the analytical form of a general mechanism
in Section 4.
2. Definitions
An allocation problem is a triple 〈n,m, v〉, where n is the number of agents,
m < n is the number of (identical) items available to allocate, and v ∈ Rn+
represents the agents’ satisfaction from consuming one item (agents do not
care for consuming multiple units). We restrict attention to value profiles v
such that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0. This is without loss of generality since our
problem involves only anonymous mechanisms. Monetary compensations are
possible, and utilities are quasi–linear. The space of possible value profiles
is then V = {v ∈ Rn+ | v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0}. An allocation is a pair
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(f , t) ∈ {0, 1}n × Rn, where fi = 1 if and only if agent i gets one item, and
ti represents the amount of money that agent i receives (this number can be
negative, of course, in which case agent i pays that amount). Hence, the total
utility of agent i when implementing the allocation (f , t) is fivi+ti, if her value
for an item is vi. A mechanism is a pair of functions f : Rn+ → {0, 1}n and
t : Rn+ → Rn. Thus, it determines an allocation for each possible report from
the agents regarding their value for an item. We slightly abuse the notation
and define fi(v) = (f(v))i and ti(v) = (t(v))i. The vector v−i ∈ Rn−1 denotes
values of the agents other than agent i and the vector v can be written as
(vi, v−i). We focus on mechanisms that satisfy the following constraints:
• Feasibility: no more than m items should be allocated, and the sum
of payments to the agents should be less than or equal to zero, for all
value profiles v.
n∑
i=1
fi(v) ≤ m and
n∑
i=1
ti(v) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V
• Strategy–proofness: it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report
her value truthfully.
fi(vi, v−i)vi + ti(vi, v−i) ≥ fi(v′i, v−i)vi + ti(v′i, v−i) ∀v ∈ V, i, v′i
• Individual Rationality: it is in each agent’s interest to participate in
the mechanism, for all value profiles v.
fi(v)vi + ti(v) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, i
We now define the index that we use to measure the overall efficiency of
a mechanism (f, t) that is implemented truthfully (an equivalent index was
used in (Moulin, 2009; Guo and Conitzer, 2009, 2008)). If the true value
profile is v, then the social welfare realized by the mechanism is equal to∑n
i=1[vifi(v) + ti(v)]. However, this number is not informative on its own.
Instead, we would like to know how far it is from the first–best solution, i.e.
from the maximal welfare one could achieve if the agents’ values were known.
In order to have an index that is unit–free (i.e., homogenous of degree zero), it
is natural to consider a ratio. Finally, since the agents’ values are not known,
nor their probabilistic distribution, it is natural to consider the worst–case
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index. To summarize, the index that we use to measure the performance of
a mechanism (f, t) that is truthfully implemented is given by the following
ratio:
min
v∈V
∑n
i=1[fi(v)vi + ti(v)]
maxf ′∈F(m)
∑n
i=1 f
′
ivi
,
where F(m) = {f ′ ∈ {0, 1}n|∑ni=1 f ′i ≤ m}. Finding a mechanism whose
ratio is β means that a proportion β of the maximal social welfare is achieved,
independently of what the true values are. Following the convention v1 ≥
v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0, the denominator becomes
∑m
i=1 vi and we write the ratio
as6
min
v∈V
∑n
i=1[fi(v)vi + ti(v)]∑m
i=1 vi
The formal content of the question stated in the introduction can thus be
summarized by the following optimization problem:
max
(f,t)
min
v∈V
∑n
i=1[fi(v)vi + ti(v)]∑m
i=1 vi
(1)
n∑
i=1
fi(v) ≤ m ∀v ∈ V (2)
n∑
i=1
ti(v) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V (3)
fi(vi, v−i)vi + ti(vi, v−i) ≥ fi(v′i, v−i)vi + ti(v′i, v−i) ∀v ∈ V, i, v′i (4)
fi(v)vi + ti(v) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, i (5)
The problem above can be simplified using the characterization of dominant–
strategy implementable mechanisms in settings where agent’s private infor-
mation is a single number vi ∈ R.
Theorem 1 (e.g., see Nisan et al. (2007) p. 229). A mechanism (f, t)
is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if for each agent i: (i) fi
6The allocation problem is trivial if
∑m
i=1 vi = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume∑m
i=1 vi > 0.
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is monotone7 in vi; (ii) ti(v) = h(v−i)−τ(v−i) if fi(v) = 1 (i.e., i is allocated)
and ti(v) = h(v−i) otherwise, where τ(v−i) = supvi|fi(vi,v−i)=0 vi defines the
threshold.8,9
These mechanisms are easy to interpret. Each agent faces a personalized
price (the threshold τ) that is determined by the reports of the other agents.
She gets the good if and only if her reported value is larger than this price,
and must pay it in exchange. The collected money can be redistributed to
some extent to the agents via the rebate function h. The Groves mechanisms
form a special case, where i’s price is the mth largest component of v−i.
The allocation function f is determined by the threshold function, while
the payment function t is determined by the threshold and rebate functions.
Thus, we can restate the optimization problem (1)–(5) using these functions.
.
max
(h,τ)
min
v∈V
∑
i|vi≥τ(v−i)(vi − τ(v−i)) +
∑n
i=1 h(v−i)∑m
i=1 vi
#{i|vi ≥ τ(v−i)} ≤ m ∀v ∈ V
n∑
i=1
h(v−i) ≤
∑
i|vi≥τ(v−i)
τ(v−i) ∀v ∈ V
h(v−i) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, i
The first constraint is the feasibility constraint with respect to the items
being allocated10, while the second constraint is the feasibility constraint
7Monotonicity of fi in vi means that if an agent is allocated when she reports vi, she
is also allocated when she reports v′i ≥ vi.
8An agent i is allocated if and only if her report is above the threshold τ(v−i).
9As our focus is on anonymous mechanisms, the theorem was adapted to payment
functions h (rather than hi) that do not vary from agent to agent.
10 For notational convenience, from now on we restrict our attention to profiles v where
all components are distinct. This restriction is introduced without loss of generality as we
can extend the mechanism to all value profiles by using uniform lotteries to break ties, as
is usually done in papers on auctions. Suppose for instance that agent i should receive an
item, and that more than m other agents have the same value as i. Anonymity would then
conflict with feasibility. A uniform lottery can then be used to determine which subset
of agents receives an item, among all those that have the same value. Even so, the way
agents react to risk is irrelevant because all the outcomes of the lottery are equivalent in
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with respect to money (the sum of all rebates should be no more than the
amount collected from the agents that get an item). The third constraint is
the individual rationality constraint (remember that an agent’s value must
be larger than the threshold when she gets an item, and so this constraint
is trivially satisfied for her as well). The strategy–proofness constraint is no
longer needed as all threshold mechanisms are strategy–proof.
We now propose a last formulation of our optimization problem. We
remove the minimization over v by introducing a variable r ∈ R denoting
the best ratio that holds for any profile of values. The resulting optimization
program appears in Figure 1.
max
(h,τ),r
r (6)
∑
i|vi≥τ(v−i)
(vi − τ(v−i)) +
n∑
i=1
h(v−i) ≥ r
m∑
i=1
vi ∀v ∈ V (7)
#{i|vi ≥ τ(v−i)} ≤ m ∀v ∈ V (8)
n∑
i=1
h(v−i) ≤
∑
i|vi≥τ(v−i)
τ(v−i) ∀v ∈ V (9)
h(v−i) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, i (10)
Figure 1: The problem of finding an optimal mechanism stated as an optimization
problem.
A solution to the mathematical program above is the optimal mechanism
for the allocation domain.11 However, the program is hard to solve both
analytically and computationally for the following reasons. Firstly, maxi-
mization is over arbitrary functions h and τ . Secondly, the program has an
infinite number of constraints as the set of possible value profiles v ∈ V is
infinite. Thirdly, the constraints include indicator variables: for example, the
summation on the right-hand side of Equation 9 can equivalently be stated
as
∑
i τ(v−i)1{vi≥τ(v−i)}. In the next section we tackle the problem compu-
terms of utility. Specifically, the lottery is between receiving an item worth vi at a price
pi and receiving a rebate hi such that hi = vi − pi.
11A lower bound on the objective value is given by the ratio of the optimal efficient
mechanism (Moulin, 2009; Guo and Conitzer, 2009).
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tationally. Guided by the computational results, in Section 4 we propose a
closed-form mechanism and prove that it has high performance guarantees.
3. Numerical Approach and Results
This section uses a computational approach to find heuristic solutions to the
problem in Figure 1. We make assumptions restricting the space of solutions
to make the problem computationally tractable, and find optimal mecha-
nisms within the restricted class. Although not generally optimal, these so-
lutions have high performance guarantees providing significant improvement
over known mechanisms. The steps we take to restrict the solution space and
the numerical results help identify a simple and well-performing mechanism,
which we present in Section 4.
There are infinitely many constraints in the optimization problem in Fig-
ure 1 and the problem is non-linear due to indicator variables. However,
notice that if we fix a threshold function τ and only optimize over rebate
functions, the indicator variables disappear, and the optimization problem
becomes a linear program. This linear program cannot be solved directly as
it has an infinite number of constraints—one for each possible value profile
v ∈ V . To deal with this, we observe that if one can subdivide the value
space into (convex) regions where the constraints are linear, then it is enough
to enforce constraints only at the extreme points of each region.12 We restrict
attention to the threshold and rebate functions for which we can partition
the space of value profiles into such regions.
Letting w ∈ Rn−1 refer to a profile of agents’ values with one agent
excluded, we make two assumptions.
Assumption 1. The threshold function is of the form τ(w) = max(kwp, wm),
with k ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (m− 1)}.
Adding the wm–component inside the max operator guarantees that no more
than m items are allocated, as required by the feasibility constraint. The
p parameter determines how many items are guaranteed to be allocated,
independently of the agents’ reports. The parameter k controls how large
the values of agents p + 1 through m must be for them to be allocated.
12The ideas underlying this technique have been proposed in (Guo and Conitzer, 2008)
and generalized in (Naroditskiy et al., 2012; Dufton et al., 2012).
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Taking k = 0 brings us back to Groves mechanisms, while setting of k = 1
means that items p+ 1, . . . ,m are always destroyed.
For a given pair of parameters (k, p), the threshold function τ(w) =
max(kwp, wm) is linear on two regions:
τ(w) =
{
kwp if kwp ≥ wm
wm otherwise
We restrict the rebate function to be linear on the same regions.
Assumption 2. The rebate function h is linear in values on two regions:
h(w; a, b) =
{
aw if kwp ≥ wm
bw otherwise
where a, b ∈ Rn−1.
The approach we follow to optimize over the class of mechanisms satis-
fying these assumptions is summarized in Figure 2. We consider threshold
functions satisfying Assumption 1 with k coming from a finite set of con-
stants between 0 and 1 and p taking any value between 1 and m − 1. For
each threshold function specified by k and p, we compute the rebate function
that guarantees the highest social welfare among rebate functions satisfying
Assumption 2. We then select the threshold and the corresponding rebate
functions that achieved the highest welfare among the ones we considered.
The key step is computation of optimal rebates, which is the focus of the rest
of this section.
To tackle computation of rebates, we first characterize the regions where
the rebate function is linear and the number of allocated items is constant.
By the definition of the threshold function τ = max(kwp, wm), there are
m− p+ 1 possible allocations (the first p agents get the items, the first p+ 1
agents get the items, . . . , the first m agents get the items) determined by
the position of kvp among vp . . . vm. The rebate function h(w) is resolved to
one of the two linear functions (aw or bw) when the position of kvp relative
to vm and vm+1 and the position of kvp+1 relative to vm+1 are determined
(see Figure 3). Below, we partition the space of values into regions where the
allocation is determined and payment is resolved to either aw or bw. A region
Vj,· positions kvp between vj and vj+1 determining allocation and payment
for some of the agents. Payment for the rest of the agents is determined by
12
For the allocation problem with m items and n agents:
1. let K denote a finite set of values for the parameter k
2. for each threshold function τkp given by k ∈ K and p ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}
– find the optimal rebate function hkp that satisfies Assump-
tion 2
3. choose the mechanism (τkp, hkp) with the highest welfare
Figure 2: Computational search for a welfare-maximizing mechanism.
i ∈ {1. . . p}
fi = 1, ti(v) = −max(kvp+1, vm+1) +
{
av−i if kvp+1 ≥ vm+1
bv−i otherwise
i ∈ {(p+ 1) . . .m}
if vi ≥ kvp: fi = 1, ti(v) = −max(kvp, vm+1) +
{
av−i if kvp ≥ vm+1
bv−i otherwise
otherwise: fi = 0, ti =
{
av−i if kvp ≥ vm+1
bv−i otherwise
i ∈ {(m+ 1) . . . n}
fi = 0, ti =
{
av−i if kvp ≥ vm
bv−i otherwise
Figure 3: Mechanism satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
the second subscript which specifies whether kvp+1 is above (>) or below (<)
vm+1.
∀j ∈ {p . . .m+ 1}
Vj,> = {v ∈ V |v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vp ≥ · · · ≥ vj ≥ kvp ≥ vj+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vm ≥ · · · ≥ vn
AND kvp+1 ≥ vm+1}
Vj,< = {v ∈ V |v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vp ≥ · · · ≥ vj ≥ kvp ≥ vj+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vm ≥ · · · ≥ vn
AND kvp+1 ≤ vm+1}
13
The collection of regions above partitions the space {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ v2 ≥
. . . ≥ vn ≥ 0}. We group constraints by region and restate the optimization
problem (see Figure 4). Notice that on each region the constraints are of
the form dv ≥ 0 for some d ∈ Rn, which means that they are satisfied
at λv (∀λ > 0) as soon as they are satisfied at v. Hence we can assume
without loss of generality that v1 = 1 and focus on polytopes of vectors
(v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn−1. A polytope Vj,> (symmetrically Vj,<) is given by (n+ 2)
inequalities:
1 ≥ v2, v2 ≥ v3, · · · , vj ≥ kvp, kvp ≥ vj+1, · · · , vn−1 ≥ vn, vn ≥ 0
kvp+1 ≥ vm+1
The following fact tells us that it is enough to restrict attention to the extreme
points of each of these polytopes.
Fact 1. For any coefficients a ∈ Rn and b ∈ R, a linear constraint av ≥ b
holds at all v ∈ P of a polytope P ⊂ Rn if and only if it holds at the points
v ∈ ExtremePoints(P ), where ExtremePoints(P ) denotes the set of extreme
points of polytope P .
Thus, making sure the constraints hold at the extreme points of Vj,· guar-
antees that the constraints hold everywhere on the Vj,· polytope. Now the
linear program in Figure 4 can be solved by enforcing constraints only at the
extreme points of each Vj,· polytope.
Example As an example consider the allocation problem with n = 3, m =
2 and the threshold function specified by k = .5 and p = 1: τ(w) =
max(.5w1, w2). The threshold function for agent 1 is max(.5v2, v3) < v1 (see
Figure 3). So agent 1 is always allocated an item. The threshold for agent 2
is max(.5v1, v3). Agent 2 is allocated an item only when v2 ≥ .5v1. Agent 3
is never allocated an item as the threshold for agent 3 is max(.5v1, v2) > v3.
The rebate function is linear when in addition to allocation, the position
of .5v1 and .5v2 relative to v3 is determined. Taking v1 = 1 we can represent
this on a 2-dimensional graph (Figure 5). The space is divided into 5 regions,
with each region having a linear rebate function and a fixed allocation. To
make sure the constraints hold for all {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3}, we just need
to enforce each region’s constraints at its extreme points. For example, the
extreme points of the right bottom region after adding v1 = 1 as the first
component are (1,.5,0), (1,.5,.25), (1,1,.5), (1,1,0).
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max
a,b∈Rn−1,r∈R
r
∀j ∈ {p . . .m+ 1}, v ∈ Vj,>
j∑
i=1
vi −
p∑
i=1
kvp+1 −
j∑
i=p+1
kvp +
n∑
i=1
h(v−i; a, b) ≥ r
m∑
i=1
vi
n∑
i=1
h(v−i; a, b) ≤
p∑
i=1
kvp+1 +
j∑
i=p+1
kvp
h(v−i; a, b) ≥ 0 ∀i
∀j ∈ {p . . .m}, v ∈ Vj,<
j∑
i=1
vi −
p∑
i=1
vm+1 −
j∑
i=p+1
kvp +
n∑
i=1
h(v−i; a, b) ≥ r
m∑
i=1
vi
n∑
i=1
h(v−i; a, b) ≤
p∑
i=1
vm+1 +
j∑
i=p+1
kvp
h(v−i; a, b) ≥ 0 ∀i
Figure 4: Linear program with constraints grouped by regions Vj,> and Vj,<.
We find mechanisms for different values of n and m using the computa-
tional procedure described in Figure 2. The class of threshold functions we
consider is given by all pairs (k, p) where k takes values in {0, .025, .05, . . . , .975}
and p in {1, 2, . . . ,m−1}. We used CPLEX 11.2.0 as a linear program solver.
For any fixed values of n and m we found that a mechanism with p set to
m − 1 achieves the highest ratio. This setting of p means that at most one
item is destroyed. This result is consistent with the one obtained by Guo
and Conitzer (2008) for randomized Groves mechanisms. They find that the
best mechanism randomizes between destroying one item and not destroying
any items.
The mechanisms we find provide the most improvement when the number
of items is close to the number of agents. Our ratio gets closer to the ratio
of the best Groves mechanism as the number of items gets smaller and ap-
proximately around m = n
2
the ratios and the mechanisms coincide. Figure 6
shows this trend for 10 agents and varying number of items. Also plotted
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Figure 5: (v1 = 1) Regions where the number of allocated items remains constant and
the rebate function is linear for 3 agents and 2 items. Each region is labeled with the
coefficients used in the rebate function for each agent, e.g. (b,a,a) means that the rebate
functions for agents 1,2, and 3 are bv−1, av−2, and av−3 respectively. One item is allocated
to the left of the vertical line v2 = k and two items to the right.
are the ratios achieved by the best VCG redistribution mechanism as well
as the ratio achieved by the mechanism that first destroys a fixed number
of items and then applies an optimal redistribution mechanism (see deter-
ministic burning mechanism in Guo and Conitzer (2008)). All mechanisms
coincide when the number of items is 4 or fewer.
4. Analytical Results
After analyzing mechanisms obtained numerically for various values of n and
m, we noticed a pattern and derived a simple mechanism parameterized by n
and m. We show that this mechanism, termed SimpleDestroy (SD), achieves
the ratio of at least 1 − (
n−m+1
2 )
(n2)
, which for any m ≥ .555n is at least 0.8
asymptotically; moreover, when m is close to n, the ratio approaches 1.
4.1. The SimpleDestroy mechanism
The SimpleDestroy mechanism is defined in Figure 7. Note that it satisfies
Assumptions 1 and 2 and is equivalently determined by the parameters p =
m− 1, k = n−m
n
and the coefficients a = (0, . . . , 0), b = (0, . . . , 0,−k, 1).
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Figure 6: Performance of various mechanisms as a function of the number of items.
Intuitively, the mechanism is specified in two cases based on the amount
of payment collected from the allocated agents before rebates. If the collected
amount is small relative to the social welfare, then there are no rebates. This
case occurs when the threshold is a fraction of the value of the last agent who
is guaranteed to be allocated: τ(w) = kwm−1. On the other hand, when the
threshold is above kwm−1, the mechanism makes sure enough redistribution
occurs if a significant portion of welfare is collected.
τ(w) = max {kwm−1 ; wm}
h(w) =
{
0 if τ(w) = kwm−1
wm − kwm−1 if τ(w) = wm
where k =
n−m
n
.
Figure 7: The SimpleDestroy Mechanism.
The next theorem proves that the SimpleDestroy mechanism satisfies the
constraints and achieves good performance.
Theorem 2. The SimpleDestroy mechanism is individually rational, subsidy–
free, and achieves the ratio of at least 1− (
n−m+1
2 )
(n2)
.
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Proof First note, that the rebate function is nonnegative, as its value is dif-
ferent from 0 only if wm >
n−m
n
wm−1, in which case h(w) = wm− n−mn wm−1 >
0. So, individual rationality always holds.
The threshold function τ(w) = max
{
n−m
n
wm−1 ; wm
}
allows two alloca-
tions: agents 1 . . . (m − 1) are allocated when vm < n−mn vm−1 and agents
1 . . .m are allocated otherwise. We prove for each case separately.
(I) Assume vm ≥ n−mn vm−1, that is, m items are allocated. This also
defines the threshold and the rebates to agents i = m + 1, . . . , n for
which (v−i)m = vm and (v−i)m−1 = vm−1, and hence τ(v−i) = vm and
h(v−i) = vm − n−mn vm−1. For agents i = 1, . . . ,m, there are three
possibilities as follows.
(Ia) If vm+1 ≥ n−mn vm−1, then also vm+1 ≥ n−mn vm, and thus for all
i = 1, . . . ,m we have τ(v−i) = vm+1. The rebates are given by
h(v−m) = vm+1 − n−mn vm−1 and h(v−j) = vm+1 − n−mn vm for j =
1, . . . ,m− 1. Thereby, in this case we have
n∑
i=1
h(v−i)−
m∑
i=1
τ(v−i)
=
[
(m− 1)
(
vm+1 − n−m
n
vm
)
+
(
vm+1 − n−m
n
vm−1
)
+(n−m)
(
vm − n−m
n
vm−1
)]
−mvm+1
=
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n
(vm − vm−1) ≤ 0,
and so the SimpleDestroy mechanism is subsidy-free. The ratio
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is bounded as follows:
rSD(n,m) =
∑m
i=1 vi +
∑n
i=1 h(v−i)−
∑m
i=1 τ(v−i)∑m
i=1 vi
=
∑m
i=1 vi +
(n−m)(n−m+1)
n (vm − vm−1)∑m
i=1 vi
= 1 +
(n−m)(n−m+ 1) (vm − vm−1)
n
∑m
i=1 vi
≥ 1 + (n−m)(n−m+ 1)
(
n−m
n vm−1 − vm−1
)
n
∑m
i=1 vi
= 1− (n−m)(n−m+ 1)mvm−1
n2
∑m
i=1 vi
≥ 1− (n−m)(n−m+ 1)m
n2
[
(m− 1) + n−mn
]
= 1− (n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n(n− 1) = 1−
(
n−m+1
2
)(
n
2
) ,
where the inequalities follow from vm ≥ n−mn vm−1 and vj ≥
vm−1 ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
(Ib) If n−m
n
vm−1 > vm+1 ≥ n−mn vm, then τ(v−m) = n−mn vm−1 and
h(v−m) = 0. For agents i = 1, . . . ,m − 1 we have τ(v−i) = vm+1
and h(v−j) = vm+1 − n−mn vm, as before. In this case,
n∑
i=1
h(v−i)−
m∑
i=1
τ(v−i)
=
[
(m− 1)
(
vm+1 − n−m
n
vm
)
+ (n−m)
(
vm − n−m
n
vm−1
)]
−
[
(m− 1)vm+1 + n−m
n
vm−1
]
=
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n
(vm − vm−1) ≤ 0,
as required by the no–subsidy constraint. The bound on the ratio
is achieved in the same way as in the previous case.
(Ic) Finally, if n−m
n
vm−1 ≥ n−mn vm ≥ vm+1 (with at least one inequality
being strict), then all agents i = 1, . . . ,m get zero rebates, and
the thresholds are τ(v−m) = n−mn vm−1 and τ(v−j) =
n−m
n
vm for
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j = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Now,
n∑
i=1
h(v−i)−
m∑
i=1
τ(v−i)
= (n−m)
(
vm − n−m
n
vm−1
)
−
[
(m− 1)n−m
n
vm +
n−m
n
vm−1
]
=
(n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n
(vm − vm−1) ≤ 0,
so the no–subsidy holds. The ratio bound follows as in the pre-
vious case.
(II) Assume vm <
n−m
n
vm−1, that is, m − 1 items are allocated. This also
implies vm+1 <
n−m
n
vm−1, and so for all agents i = m, . . . , n we have
τ(v−i) = n−mn vm−1 and h(v−i) = 0. For agents i = 1, . . . ,m − 1, there
are two possibilities as follows.
(IIa) If vm+1 ≥ n−mn vm, then τ(v−i) = vm+1 and h(v−i) = vm+1− n−mn vm
for all i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Thus, in this case we have
n∑
i=1
h(v−i)−
m−1∑
i=1
τ(v−i)
= (m− 1)
(
vm+1 − n−m
n
vm
)
− (m− 1)vm+1 = −(m− 1)(n−m)
n
vm ≤ 0,
and so the SimpleDestroy mechanism is subsidy-free. The ratio
is bounded as follows:
rSD(n,m) =
∑m−1
i=1 vi +
∑n
i=1 h(v−i)−
∑m−1
i=1 τ(v−i)∑m
i=1 vi
=
∑m−1
i=1 vi − (m−1)(n−m)n vm∑m
i=1 vi
=
∑m
i=1 vi − (m−1)(n−m)n vm − vm∑m
i=1 vi
= 1− m(n−m+ 1)vm
n
∑m
i=1 vi
> 1− m(n−m+ 1)
n
(
(m− 1) nn−m + 1
)
= 1− (n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n(n− 1) = 1−
(
n−m+1
2
)(
n
2
) ,
where the inequality is implied by vi ≥ vm−1 > nn−mvm ≥ 0 for
i = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
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(IIb) If vm+1 <
n−m
n
vm, then τ(v−i) = n−mn vm and h(v−i) = 0 for all
i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. In this case,
n∑
i=1
h(v−i)−
m−1∑
i=1
τ(v−i)
= 0− (m− 1)n−m
n
vm = −(m− 1)(n−m)
n
vm ≤ 0,
so the no–subsidy holds, and the ratio bound follows as before.
The proof is now complete. 
Recall that the ratio of the optimal Groves mechanism is close to 1 when
the number of items is small. However, it is not difficult to check that it
decreases as the number of items increases, and reaches 0 once the number of
items is as high as it can be: one fewer than the number of agents. Indeed,
this ratio, derived by Moulin (2009) and Guo and Conitzer (2009), is
rVCG(n,m) = 1−
(
n−1
m
)∑n−1
j=m
(
n−1
j
)
On the other hand, as shown above, the ratio of SimpleDestroy increases with
the number of items. For each n, there exists a unique integer m∗ < n such
that SimpleDestroy overtakes the optimal Groves mechanism, whenever there
are at least m∗ items to allocate. While there is no simple closed-form expres-
sion of m∗ as a function of n, it is simple enough to compute it numerically
for specific values of n, using the expressions of rVCG and rSD. We observe
that m∗ seems to always fall in the neighborhood of 1/2 (see Figure 8). Sim-
pleDestroy performs best when the number of items is the largest, i.e. when
the optimal Groves mechanism performs the worst. This motivates the def-
inition of the hybrid mechanism, which uses the optimal Groves mechanism
when the number of items is less than m∗ and SimpleDestroy otherwise.
We now study the limit case when both m and n are large. The purpose
of this asymptotic analysis is to better understand how SimpleDestroy and
optimal Groves compare, and in which circumstances to employ one or the
other in the hybrid mechanism. Consider two increasing sequences (nq) and
(mq) of positive integers such that mq < nq for all q, the number nq → ∞
when q →∞, and the sequence (mq
nq
) converges to some α ∈ (0, 1) (thus to be
interpreted as the maximal percentage of the population that could receive
an item).
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(a) n = 10 (b) n = 20 (c) n = 50
Figure 8: Performance of optimal Groves with Redistribution and SimpleDestroy mecha-
nisms.
Proposition 1.
1.
rVCG(α) := lim
q→∞
rVCG(nq,mq) =
{
1 α ≤ 1/2
1−α
α
α > 1/2
(see Moulin (2009), Theorem 3).
2. rSD(α) := limq→∞ rSD(nq,mq) = 2α− α2.
3. The asymptotically best hybrid mechanism is obtained by choosing m∗ ∼
0.555n. It guarantees a ratio of at least 0.8 for any α.
Proof Note that
rSD(n,m) = 1− (n−m)(n−m+ 1)
n(n− 1) =
2(m− 1)
n− 1 −
m(m− 1)
n(n− 1)
Hence,
lim
q→∞
rSD(nq,mq) = lim
q→∞
(
2(mq − 1)
nq − 1 −
mq(mq − 1)
nq(nq − 1)
)
= 2α− α2
The asymptotically best hybrid mechanism and its associated guaranteed
ratio are then obtained by solving the equation 1−m
∗
m∗ = 2m
∗ − (m∗)2. 
Notice that rSD(·) is non-negative and monotonically increasing for α be-
tween 0 and 1; moreover, it is concave (quadratic in α), and so the ratio
becomes quickly higher for relatively low α’s. The function rVCG(·), on the
other hand, is monotonically decreasing and convex when α > 1/2, implying
that the ratio becomes quickly lower for α’s larger than 1/2. For instance,
if there are enough items to serve 75% of the population, then SimpleDe-
stroy asymptotically guarantees the ratio of 15
16
, while the optimal Groves
mechanism asymptotically guarantees the ratio of only 1/3.
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5. Discussion
Allocative efficiency of Groves mechanisms conflicts with social welfare in
the fundamental allocation model we consider. This means a lot of money
may need to be burnt to maintain strategy-proofness, especially when the
proportion of allocated agents is high. In particular, the social welfare is lost
completely when there are enough items for all but one agent, and all agents
have the same value for consuming an item. In this case, the Groves payment
equals the value, and no redistribution is possible (Moulin, 2009; Guo and
Conitzer, 2009).
It turns out that a small departure from efficiency lets us recover most of
the loss. Specifically, this paper presents the SimpleDestroy mechanism that
sometimes does not allocate to the last agent who would be allocated under
an efficient mechanism, and guarantees a high level of social welfare when
the number of items is at least half the number of agents. In contrast to effi-
cient mechanisms, the welfare guaranteed by this mechanism increases with
the percentage of allocated agents, and rapidly goes to 1 as the number of
items approaches the number of agents. Furthermore, it follows that a hybrid
mechanism applying the optimal Groves mechanism for m < .555n and Sim-
pleDestroy otherwise, guarantees a high level of social welfare (asymptotic
ratio of at least 0.8) for all allocation instances.
Our results are guided by an algorithmic procedure that exploits linearity
inherent in the model. Specifically, we restrict attention to a class of mech-
anisms where optimization can be performed via linear programming, and
numerically find mechanisms which are optimal within this restricted class.13
In many cases, these mechanisms guarantee social welfare which is close to
the total social welfare, and thus no further significant improvement is possi-
ble. However, they are not generally optimal. For instance, for the problem
with 3 agents and 2 items we were able to find the following provably optimal
13A similar methodology was used in (Guo and Conitzer, 2010a) to derive optimal
payments when free items are efficiently allocated. More generally, algorithmic approaches
to mechanism design problems are considered in (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002; Guo and
Conitzer, 2010a).
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mechanism:14
τ(w) = max
(
1
4
(w1 + w2), w2
)
h(w) =

2
32
w2 if 1
9
w1 ≥ w2
−10
32
w1 + 11
32
w2 if 1
3
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ 1
9
w1
− 4
32
w1 + 20
32
w2 otherwise
This mechanism guarantees the ratio of .75, which is higher than what can
be obtained for 3 agents and 2 items by the mechanisms within the restricted
class we considered. The challenge is then to find a general mechanism that
is provably optimal for any number of items and agents. A few simpler ques-
tions will need to be answered along the way: is the natural property that if
an agent with value vi is allocated then all agents with values above vi are
also allocated, consistent with an optimal mechanism? Is destroying more
than one item ever beneficial? Another interesting open question is whether
a broader class of mechanisms would provide a significant asymptotic im-
provement for general problem instances. A different avenue for future work
is investigating destruction in other models. For instance, an efficient mech-
anism for allocating heterogeneous items (Gujar and Narahari, 2011) has
recently been proven optimal by Guo (2012). Designing inefficient mecha-
nisms with better welfare guarantees in this heterogeneous model is an open
question. Another class of problems where destruction mechanisms may be
beneficial is online allocation mechanisms (Parkes, 2007).
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